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CASE STUDY ILLUSTRATING THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: CHECHNYA 
Anywhere, anytime I could recognize that soldier. I want him and 
the others responsible for the deaths of the people to be punished. I 
am ready to repeat my testimony anywhere, in any court. “Ibragim 
I.,” recounting the murder of his uncle Ahampash Dudayev. 
 Don’t you dare touch the soldiers and officers of the Russian 
army. They are doing a sacred thing today—they are defending 
Russia. And don’t you dare sully the Russian soldier with your dirty 
hands! Major-General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the 
troops at Alkhan-Yurt, dismissing calls for accountability for the 
abuses committed there.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Khashiyev fled Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, when the fighting 
started,2 leaving his brother to look after their property.3 When he returned 
several months later, he found his brother dead in a garage near their 
home.4 Khashiyev could see numerous gunshot wounds, bruises, and 
broken bones.5 His brother’s body had been mutilated, parts of his skull 
had been smashed, and several of his fingers were missing.6 Khashiyev 
filed a complaint with the local Russian prosecutor, asking for a criminal 
investigation into the death of his brother.7 After a cursory review, 
however, the prosecutor refused to open an investigation.8 He claimed he 
could not find corpus delicti in the actions of Russian soldiers.9 Failed by 
the Russian criminal justice system, Khashiyev’s only hope for seeing 
those responsible for his brother’s death punished lay in the international 
 1. “No Happiness Remains” Civilian Killings, Pillage, and Rape in Alkhan-Yurt, Chechnya, 12 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Apr. 2000, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya2/ 
Rusch004.htm#P52_1657 (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter No Happiness Remains]. 
 2. See infra Part I (discussing the Chechen Wars). 
 3. Khashiyev v. Russia, (No. 57942/00) Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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criminal law system. But is the international criminal law system capable 
of providing criminal accountability for atrocities committed in 
Chechnya? 
This Note argues that, for jurisdictional reasons, the current 
international criminal law system is powerless to reach the Russian 
soldiers, military officers, and government officials responsible for the 
atrocities committed against Chechen civilians.10 In spite of the recent 
formation of various international tribunals and courts of both general and 
narrow jurisdiction, there are still shortcomings in the international 
criminal law system that prevent it from reaching every international 
atrocity. These shortcomings effectively provide impunity for those 
responsible for the atrocities in Chechnya.  
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide an overview of 
the devastation inflicted upon Chechen civilians during the two Chechen 
Wars.11 Part II will examine these criminal acts in the context of the 
Russian Criminal Code and will assess the ability of the Russian criminal 
system to effectively prosecute breaches of the Code.12 Part III of this Note 
will examine the atrocities committed in Chechnya as breaches of 
international criminal law.13 In particular, Part III will examine a sample of 
the specific breaches of international criminal law committed by Russian 
soldiers, military officers, and government officials.14 Finally, Part IV will 
identify the specific jurisdictional barriers that prevent any international 
criminal tribunal or court from prosecuting those responsible for the 
Chechen atrocities.15 
 10. It is undisputed that Chechen rebel fighters have also committed acts amounting to breaches 
of Russian domestic law and international criminal law. See, e.g., Memorandum on Accountability for 
Humanitarian Law Violations in Chechnya, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Oct. 20, 2000, at 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/eu-summit/chech-memo-1020.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (noting 
Chechen forces have repeatedly violated international law by “summarily executing servicemen . . . 
physically abusing civilians, and violating civilian immunity.”). The scope of this Note, however, is 
limited to breaches committed by individual Russian soldiers, military officers, and government 
officials against Chechen civilians. This Note will not address claims victims may have against the 
State of Russia. 
 11. See infra notes 16–76 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 79–150 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 153–270 and accompanying text. This Part will provide only a sample of the 
potential breaches of international criminal law that occurred and are occurring in the Chechen 
conflicts. In particular, I will address war crimes and crimes against humanity. In addition, however, 
one might also argue that Russian forces have committed violations of the laws and customs of war 
and even genocide, for example. Chechen Body Urges EU to Condemn Russia for War Crimes, BBC 
MONITORING (Caucasus), Nov. 27, 2004. 
 14. See infra notes 153–270 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 272–355 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE CHECHEN WARS 
The Chechen Wars have taken a devastating toll on both Chechnya’s 
innocent civilians and the country’s infrastructure. In this part, I will first 
provide a brief history of the two Chechen Wars and the tensions leading 
up to the conflicts. Second, I will present a picture of the devastation 
inflicted upon Chechen civilians. 
A. History 
There has been a long history of animosity between Chechnya and the 
Kremlin. The territory of Chechnya resisted Russian military advances 
until 1859, when it was finally captured by Russia.16 However, once under 
Russian domination, unrest was always brewing.17 The tensions between 
Chechnya and the Kremlin intensified during World War II.18 Stalin, 
fearing the Chechens were aiding the German enemy, ordered the entire 
Chechen population deported to Kazakhstan.19 During the twelve year 
exile, it is estimated that at least one fifth of the population died from 
starvation, cold, or disease.20 Undoubtedly, this tragic event continues to 
invade the collective memory of much of the Chechen population and 
provides much of the impetus for Chechnya’s quest for independence from 
Russia.21 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian officials 
overseeing Chechnya were pushed from power.22 Into their place stepped 
Dzhokhar Dudaev, a Chechen fighter pilot in the Russian army.23 Dudaev 
quickly organized and won elections in Chechnya.24 Shortly after taking 
the presidency, he declared Chechnya’s independence from Russia.25 
President Yeltsin, embroiled in his own political power struggle at the 
time, did not meaningfully respond to the claim for Chechen independence 
until 1994.26 At that time, he sent Russian military forces into Chechnya to 
 16. Svante E. Cornell, The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case for 
Distinction, 27:2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 167, 169 (2003). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Johanna Nichols, The Chechen Refugees, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 241, 243 (2000). 
 21. Cornell, supra note 16, at 169. 
 22. Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in Light of 
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 115, 132 (1999). 
 23. Id. 
 24. MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, THE CHECHEN WARS 19 (2002). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Cornell, supra note 16, at 169. 
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reassert control over the territory.27 This marked the beginning of the First 
Chechen War.28  
The Russian military sought to reassert control in Grozny and capture 
Dudaev.29 Heavy fighting ensued from 1994 through 1996.30 Finally, in 
April of 1996, Russian forces succeeded in killing Dudaev and capturing 
Grozny through intense aerial bombings.31 As a result of the bombings, the 
city was virtually destroyed.32 It is often recounted that during the heaviest 
shelling in Grozny, the number of explosions per day was at least fifty 
times that of the heaviest shelling in Sarajevo.33 Furthermore, Russian 
forces indiscriminately killed civilians and destroyed villages throughout 
Chechnya.34 It is estimated that some 20,000 civilians were killed and 
hundreds of thousands were forced to seek refuge outside of Grozny 
during the siege.35 In spite of this devastating loss, the Russian military 
was eventually defeated.36 Chechen fighters succeeded in retaking Grozny 
in August of 1996.37 The war was a public disaster for Yeltsin.38 Faced 
with upcoming elections, he began to withdraw his troops after their defeat 
in Grozny.39 The war ended shortly thereafter with the Khasavyurt Peace 
Accords.40 These Accords purported to afford Chechnya de facto 
independence, but ultimately delayed discussions of status until 2001.41 
The First Chechen War was marked by awful atrocities committed against 
the civilian population.42 Horrific accounts of murder, rape, torture, and 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 170. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 33–45, for a detailed examination of this fighting. 
 31. Id. at 42–44. 
 32. See Olivia Ward, War Without Mercy: War Without End, TORONTO STAR, June 11, 1995, 
available at 1995 WL 5999425. 
 33. Cornell, supra note 16, at 170 (citing Charles Blandy, The Battle for Grozny, 7(2) JANE’S 
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 53–56 (1995)); see also EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 144 (citing DAVID 
REMNICK, RESURRECTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW RUSSIA 263–64 (1997) (“At the height of the 
shelling of Sarajevo there were thirty-five hundred detonations a day, while in Grozny the [1995] 
winter bombing reached a rate of four thousand detonations an hour.”)). 
 34. Cornell, supra note 16, at 170. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Anand M. Kandaswamy, European Institutions, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 579, 599–600 
(2003) (reviewing EVANGELISTA, supra note 24). 
 39. Id. at 599. 
 40. EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 44–45. The Khasavyurt Peace Accords were signed in 
August 1996. Id. 
 41. Id. at 45. 
 42. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 32; Refugees Accuse Russian Troops, Allege Atrocities in 
Chechnya Town, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 10, 1995, at 4A, available at 1995 WL 7103492. 
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destruction have emerged.43 To this day, many Chechens still await justice 
for the wrongs inflicted upon them during the first war.44 
General Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of Chechnya in 1997 
following the signing of the Khasavyurt Peace Accords.45 With the 
territory in ruins and the economy devastated, Maskhadov had his work 
cut out for him.46 He was ultimately unable to create a functioning 
government and never gained control over the territory.47 Chechen bandits 
engaged in kidnappings and killings to make money.48 Russians, Chechen 
civilians, and even Westerners were kidnapped and either ransomed or 
killed.49 Islamic militants united with these bandits in opposition to 
Russia.50 This group of militants and bandits effectively provoked another 
Russian invasion when they crossed over into the neighboring Muslim 
republic of Daghestan in August of 1999, hoping to unite it with 
Chechnya.51 
President Vladimir Putin responded by launching a massive military 
campaign aimed at reasserting Russian control over Chechnya.52 Thus, the 
Second Chechen War began in 1999, and continues today.53 Seeking to 
reduce its losses, Russia has used long-range weapons aimed at 
eliminating rebels in a given targeted territory.54 Such indiscriminate 
weapons, however, have resulted in a significant number of civilian 
casualties.55 Moreover, like the First Chechen War, the second conflict has 
 43. See sources cited supra note 42. 
 44. See sources cited supra note 42. 
 45. Phil Reeves & Mary Dejevsky, Analysis Chechnya: The Bloody History of a People with an 
Unquenchable Thirst for Independence, RUSSIA WEEKLY No. 229, Oct. 29, 2002, available at 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/229-8.cfm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005); see also Cornell, supra note 16, at 
167. 
 46. Reeves & Dejevsky, supra note 45. 
 47. See EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 46–59, for an overview of the Maskhadov 
administration. 
 48. Reeves & Dejevsky, supra note 45. 
 49. Id. 
 50. EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 46–47, 71–73. 
 51. Id. at 63–65. 
 52. Id. at 65. In August 1999, then-President Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as prime 
minister of Russia. Id. Yeltsin resigned four months after the Second Chechen War began. Id. at 64. 
Putin took over as interim president in December 1999 and was formally elected president in March 
2000. Id. 
 53. Id. at 64–65. 
 54. See, e.g., Henry Meyer, Bloody Russian Storm of Chechen Capital a Costly Lesson in Urban 
Warfare, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2772073. 
 55. See, e.g., David Hoffman, Attack on Chechen Civilians Confirmed; Red Cross Says Convoy 
that Included Clearly Marked Vehicles Hit by Russians, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at A31, available 
at 1999 WL 23312396; Russia Pounds Chechen Targets, Denies Attacking Refugee Convoy, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at 2A, available at 1999 WL 27325918. 
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invoked another round of civilian murder, rape, torture, and destruction.56 
Russia now claims to control Grozny; however, sporadic guerrilla fighting 
continues even today.57  
B. The Devastation 
The wars in Chechnya have been particularly violent for civilians. The 
Chechen government and most human rights groups estimate that between 
25,000 to 40,000 civilians have been killed or have disappeared 
throughout the two wars.58 There have been accounts of mass murders, 
forced disappearances, rapes, and torture.59 One of the documented mass 
murders occurred in the village of Novye Aldi.60 At least fifty civilians 
were murdered there and many more simply disappeared.61 Abulkhanov 
was one of the dead.62 A Russian soldier approached the sixty-eight year 
old man in a courtyard near his home.63 The soldier threatened to kill 
Abulkhanov if he did not take out his teeth and give the soldier his 
money.64 Abulkhanov did not immediately understand what the soldier 
was asking, and as a result, was shot execution-style.65 The soldier then 
ordered a civilian woman nearby to drag his body into a basement.66 Many 
other civilians in Novye Aldi faced a similar fate.67 
Some of the most egregious crimes have been committed in Russian 
“filtration camps.”68 The Kremlin and the Russian military created these 
 56. See sources cited supra note 55; see also Isayeva v. Russia, (No. 57947/00) Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Jan. 29, 2005); Yusupova v. Russia, (No. 
57948/00) Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Jan. 29, 2005); Bazayeva 
v. Russia, (No. 57949/00) Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Jan. 29, 
2005); 3,000 Civilians Killed in Chechnya—Public Figures, INTERFAX (Moscow), Nov. 11, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 29978056. 
 57. Cornell, supra note 16, at 172. 
 58. Nichols, supra note 20, at 250 n.15. 
 59. See generally COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Report, The Human 
Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic, Doc. 9732 (Mar. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/russ/20030409-Tchechenie/05.pdf (last visited Jan. 
29, 2005) [hereinafter Human Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic]. 
 60. Id. at paras. 20–22. 
 61. Id. 
 62. ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, A DIRTY WAR 312 (John Crowfoot trans., 2001) (1999). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See generally POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62. 
 68. EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 154; Hundreds of Chechens Detained in “Filtration 
Camps”, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Feb. 2000, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/Chech0218.htm 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005). 
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camps as a place to send Chechen civilians to determine if they were true 
civilians or Chechen rebels.69 Chechen civilians from the ages of ten to 
sixty were arrested in their homes, on the streets, and at Russian 
checkpoints and were sent to various filtration camps located throughout 
Chechnya.70 The filtering process itself often consisted of extracting false 
confessions through brutal torture.71 The experience of Lom-Ali is 
indicative of the awful torture inflicted upon civilians.72 Lom-Ali was only 
fifteen years old when he was detained by Russian forces.73 He was sent to 
a Russian filtration camp where he was subjected to brutal torture in an 
attempt to coerce him into admitting that he was a Chechen rebel.74 
Russian guards hammered him to a wall with kebab sticks, chained him to 
a post and beat him until his ribs were broken, stubbed out cigarettes on 
him, suffocated him in a polythene bag, and tied a noose around his neck, 
continually tightening it until he lost consciousness.75 Unfortunately, 
stories of such horrendous torture in Russian filtration camps are quite 
common.76 
Civilians in Chechnya have endured years of violence and terror at the 
hands of Russian forces. These gruesome stories are just two of thousands. 
More of these stories will be told throughout this Note as I examine 
Russian breaches of domestic and international law. 
II. JUSTICE IN THE RUSSIAN CRIMINAL SYSTEM 
In theory, the Russian Criminal Code (hereinafter the “Code”) 
criminalizes the horrific acts committed against Chechen civilians during 
the Chechen Wars.77 In practice, however, the Russian criminal justice 
system has proven itself both unwilling and unable to provide justice. The 
first section of this Part will examine probable breaches of the Code 
resulting from the atrocities committed by Russian soldiers, military 
officers, and government officials during the Chechen Wars. The second 
 69. Chechen Rebel President Says Russian Amnesty Will Not Stop War, BBC MONITORING 
(Central Asia), June 19, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58936090. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. A. Gekhoyeva, Rebel Site Claims Russian Troops Torture Children in Chechnya, BBC 
MONITORING (Caucasus), Jan. 19, 2004. The child tortured, described in this article, lived to tell his 
story. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF arts. 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 131, translated in 
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (William E. Butler ed., 1999) [hereinafter UK RF]. 
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section of this Part will demonstrate the inability of the Russian criminal 
justice system to successfully impose accountability on those responsible. 
A. Breaches of Russian Criminal Law 
Many of the atrocities committed against Chechen civilians are 
specifically criminalized in the Code.78 This section will examine a sample 
of the substantive breaches of the Code committed by Russian soldiers, 
military officers, and government officials. 
The Code provides several provisions under which Chechen victims 
might seek to prosecute those responsible for the wrongs they have 
suffered.79 These provisions would apply to the actual perpetrators of the 
criminal act—often Russian soldiers or military officers.80 Potentially 
applicable substantive crimes include homicide,81 intentional causing of 
harm to health,82 beating,83 torture,84 and rape.85 All of these crimes carry 
hefty prison terms, and some even carry a possible death sentence.86 Often 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. The victims of atrocities in Chechnya can initiate criminal proceedings through written 
complaints to the prosecutor’s office. Ugolovno-Protsessual’nyi Kodeks RF art. 108, translated in 
SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES (Harold J. Berman & James W. 
Spindler trans., 1966) [hereinafter the UPK RF]. In addition, criminal proceedings can be instituted by 
complaints from citizens, social bodies, articles in the press, or discovery by investigators, prosecutors 
or courts. Id. Under the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, a “victim” is either the individual against 
whom the crime was committed, or if that person died, the family and friends of that individual. UPK 
RF art. 53.  
 80. See generally UK RF chap. 5. 
 81. UK RF art. 105 (homicide). 
 82. UK RF art. 111 (intentional causing of grave harm to health); UK RF art. 112 (average harm 
to health); UK RF art. 115 (light harm to health). 
 83. UK RF art. 116 (beating). 
 84. UK RF art. 117 (torture). 
 85. UK RF art. 131 (rape). Article 357 also criminalizes genocide. UK RF art. 357. Some 
scholars and observers argue that the Russian government has committed genocide against the 
Chechens. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 20, at 250–53. Others maintain that the Russian government 
was motivated only by a nationalist desire to preserve Chechnya as part of the Russian Federation. See, 
e.g., Trent N. Tappe, Note, Chechnya and the State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway Region of 
the Former Soviet Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims, 34 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 255, 255–58 (1995). 
 86. UK RF arts. 105, 111, 112, 115–117, 131. Under the Russian Criminal Code, homicide is 
punishable by eight years to life in prison or by the death penalty. Id. art. 105. Intentional causing of 
grave harm to health is punishable by two to fifteen years in prison. Id. art. 111. Intentional causing of 
average gravity harm to health is punishable by a term of imprisonment from three months to five 
years. Id. art. 112. Intentional causing of light harm to health is punishable by labor in a work house 
for up to one year or imprisonment for two to four months. Id. art. 115. A conviction for beating is 
punishable by up to six months in a work camp or imprisonment up to three months. Id. art. 116. 
Torture is punishable by a prison term of up to seven years. Id. art. 117. A rape conviction is 
punishable by a term of three to fifteen years imprisonment. Id. art. 131. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/10
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these provisions impose heavier sentences for crimes committed “for 
reasons of nationality, racial, or religious hatred or enmity or blood 
vengeance.”87 Although none of these provisions specifically addresses 
individuals acting in their official capacity, it is unlikely the Kremlin 
would ever defend one of its soldiers by arguing that rape or torture was 
officially sanctioned.88 
The conviction of Russian Colonel Yuri Budanov provides a good 
example of how the Russian Criminal Code can impose criminal 
accountability, even on Russian military officers.89 Budanov was 
convicted of the murder of eighteen year old Elza Kungayeva, a 
Chechen.90 Budanov admitted to killing Kungayeva, but claimed he did so 
because he believed she was a rebel fighter.91 Kungayeva’s parents 
claimed a drunken Budanov kidnapped their daughter from their home and 
then raped and strangled her.92 At his trial, Budanov was convicted under 
Articles 126 (kidnapping), 105 (murder), and 286 (abuse of office) of the 
Russian Criminal Code.93 Ignoring Budanov’s account of the incident, the 
Kremlin denounced his actions, never once insinuating that he was acting 
in his official capacity.94 Unfortunately, as will be shown in section B 
below, the Budanov case is a rare, unprecedented example of the Russian 
criminal system providing justice and accountability.95 
The substantive provisions discussed above enable victims to institute 
criminal charges against those directly responsible for the wrongs they 
have suffered.96 However, as these atrocities were being committed, there 
were often other soldiers or military officers sitting in the shadows, 
 87. UK RF art. 105; see also UK RF art. 111 (grave harm). This is relevant if one wants to make 
a claim that Russia has committed genocide against those of Chechen ethnicity. The arguments for and 
against the claim that Russia committed genocide, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 88. The criminal trial of Colonel Yuri Budanov in Russian domestic courts indicates that Russian 
military soldiers and officers who commit criminal offenses outside the scope of their official capacity 
can be prosecuted under domestic criminal law. Lyuba Pronina, Budanov Jailed for 10 Years in 
Retrial, MOSCOW TIMES, July 28, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66304069. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see also Andrew Yurkovsky, Mirror of a War, WORLD PRESS REVIEW ONLINE, Jan. 30, 
2002, at http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/921.cfm (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
 93. Russian Officer Budanov Stripped of Office and Awards, BBC MONITORING, July 25, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 58978899; see also Yurkovsky, supra note 92. 
 94. See, e.g., Pronina, supra note 88; Yastrzhembsky Comments on Col. Budanov’s Sentence, 
INTERFAX (Moscow), July 25, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60847015. 
 95. The initial 2001 trial of Colonel Budanov marked the first time a federal officer was indicted 
for committing a crime in Chechnya in either war. John Crowfoot, Postscript to POLITKOVSKAYA, 
supra note 62, at 320. 
 96. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text. 
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watching the atrocities take place, and even helping to facilitate the 
crimes.97 Chechen victims may be able to bring these soldiers and officers 
to justice as conspirators under the Russian Criminal Code.98 Article 33 of 
the Code defines a conspirator to a crime as any individual who “has 
facilitated the commission of a crime by advice, instructions, the granting 
of information, means, or implements for committing the crime or by the 
elimination of obstacles. . . .”99 A conspirator to a crime will be liable 
under the Code to the extent of his participation.100 
To date there does not appear to have been any accessory convictions 
of military officers or government officials for their roles in the various 
atrocities. However, under the Russian Criminal Code, the possibility 
remains that such individuals could eventually be held accountable.101 For 
example, conspirator charges might be appropriate against the Russian 
military officers who ordered the bombing of the civilian convoy at the 
Kavkaz-1 checkpoint outside of Grozny.102 In this case, thousands of 
civilians from Grozny were told there would be a “humanitarian corridor” 
opened for their safe passage out of the war zone.103 As advised, the 
civilians gathered in their cars at the checkpoint, waiting to pass.104 
However, instead of safe passage, the convoy was told to return home.105 
As they were slowly moving back toward Grozny, two Russian bombers 
flew in and dropped several bombs on the convoy of cars.106 Many were 
killed and wounded.107 In addition to those who actually dropped the 
bombs, the military officers or government officials who gave the 
instructions to bomb the convoy could also be charged as conspirators 
under the Code, provided they facilitated the commission of the crime by 
giving the pilots instructions to bomb the convoy and the means to do 
so.108 
It is evident that the Russian Criminal Code does provide a body of law 
criminalizing many of the atrocities committed against Chechen 
 97. See infra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
 98. See UK RF arts. 32, 33. 
 99. UK RF art. 33. 
 100. UK RF arts. 33, 34. 
 101. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 102. Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56. 
 103. Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56. 
 104. Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56. 
 105. Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56. 
 106. Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56. 
 107. Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56. 
 108. UK RF arts. 33, 34. 
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civilians.109 The substantive law covers not only those who actually carried 
out the criminal acts, but also those who were conspirators to the acts.110 In 
theory, this means that Russian soldiers, military officers, and government 
officials who either committed or assisted in such crimes can be brought to 
justice. In reality, as the next section will illustrate, criminal investigations 
against Russian soldiers, military officers, and government officials rarely 
result in formal charges or convictions. 
B. Failure of the Russian Criminal Justice System 
In spite of the hope for criminal prosecution offered by the fairly 
comprehensive Russian Criminal Code, the Russian criminal justice 
system has proven itself unwilling and incapable of providing 
accountability for the atrocities committed against Chechens.111 The 
Russian military prosecutor’s office often boasts that by December of 
2000, it had opened 748 criminal cases against servicemen for abuses 
committed in Chechnya.112 On closer look, however, it become apparent 
that the majority of cases involved only minor military offenses, such as 
loss of army property or improper handling of weapons.113 Only thirty-
seven cases actually related to incidents in Chechnya.114 This dismal 
record really is not one to boast about. In this section, I will examine 
possible reasons why the Russian criminal justice system is so ineffective 
in prosecuting those responsible for Chechen atrocities. In particular, I will 
isolate two barriers that appear to prevent the adequate functioning of the 
Russian criminal justice system: (1) the Russian military’s attitude of 
impunity fostered by the Kremlin;115 and (2) the general ineptitude of the 
prosecutors and investigators.116 These two barriers serve to effectively 
disable the Russian criminal justice system and protect Russian 
servicemen from prosecution for their criminal acts. 
The first barrier to justice is the general sense of impunity held by the 
Russian military. The general unwillingness of the Kremlin to impose 
 109. See supra notes 79–87, 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 79–87, 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 111. See infra notes 112–14. 
 112. Military Prosecutors Opened 748 Cases Against Servicemen in Northern Caucasus, 
INTERFAX (Moscow), Dec. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 31376027; Crowfoot, supra note 95, at 
320. 
 113. Crowfoot, supra note 95, at 320. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See infra notes 117–40. 
 116. See infra notes 141–50. 
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criminal liability on the military fosters this attitude of impunity.117 The 
Kremlin has preferred to turn a blind eye or to put the blame on the other 
side.118 The Kremlin bestows virtual impunity in two ways: public denials 
of civilian atrocities,119 and direct commands to local prosecutors to halt 
investigations.120 These acts have three unfortunate effects. First, those 
Russian servicemen responsible for civilian attacks escape criminal 
liability.121 Second, with immunity from prosecution for earlier 
transgressions, Russian forces assume a lasting sense of impunity that 
allows them to commit similarly atrocious acts without fear of 
prosecution. Finally, with direct denial of civilian atrocities from the 
Kremlin or with direct instructions from the Kremlin to cease further 
investigation, local prosecutors and investigators are essentially coerced 
into ignoring the thousands of claims filed by Chechen victims.122 
A striking example of impunity fostered by public denials from the 
Kremlin is the case of the destruction in Alkhan-Yurt.123 Alkhan-Yurt is a 
small village south of Grozny.124 After taking the village, Russian soldiers, 
under the command of General Vladimir Shamanov, engaged in 
“[systematic] looting and burning . . . killing everyone in their way.”125 
 117. POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62, at 313–15. In addition, the Russian “Law on the 
Suppression of Terror” grants servicemen immunity from “moral damages” caused in the conduct of a 
“counter-terrorist operation.” Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 130-FZ, available at 
http://www.legislationline.org/view.php?document=55618 (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
Sobr. Zakonod RF, 1998, No. 130-FZ]; see also Tom Parfitt, Moscow Theater Siege Victims Take 
Fight to Human Rights Judges After Failing in the Russian Courts, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 
10, 2003, available at 2003 WL S9318766. 
 The Kremlin has consistently called the Second Chechen War a counter-terrorist operation, and 
thus, soldiers often receive impunity from moral damages under that law. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, 
No. 130-FZ, supra, art. 21; see also Barry Schweid, U.S. Adds Basayev to Terror Blacklist, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, available at 2003 WL 64989915 (discussing the Second Chechen 
War as anti-terrorism operations). This in turn has probably helped to foster a broader sense of 
immunity. 
 It should be noted that there have been clear instances of terrorism by Chechen separatists. See, 
e.g., Paul Quinn Judge, They are killing Us All, TIME, Sept. 13, 2004, at 42, available at 2004 
WL92184231 (describing the Beslan elementary school seizing, the most recent terrorist incident in 
Russia that resulted in the deaths of over 300 children and adults). This Note, however, deals only with 
the actual armed conflicts occurring from roughly 1994 through 1996 and 1999 through 2000. 
 118. See, e.g., POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62, at 313–15; see also EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, 
at 150–51. 
 119. See, e.g., infra notes 123–28 and accompanying text; Vladimir Radyuhin, Russia Denies 
Massacre Report, THE HINDU, Dec. 25, 1999, available at 1999 WL 30090269; see also 
EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 150–51. 
 120. See, e.g., infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text. 
 121. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text. 
 122. See generally POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62, at 314–15. 
 123. Radyuhin, supra note 119. 
 124. No Happiness Remains, supra note 1. 
 125. Id.; see also POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62, at 116–19. 
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Russian forces killed at least twenty-three civilians and raped several 
more.126 Immediately after the atrocity, the Kremlin publicly denied that 
Russian forces committed criminal acts against the civilians in the 
village.127 But the Kremlin did not stop there. Rather than hold General 
Shamanov criminally responsible for the massacre, Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin proceeded to award Shamanov the “Hero of Russia” medal 
for his distinguished military service.128 To this day no Russian soldier has 
faced criminal prosecution for his role in the Alkhan-Yurt atrocity. 
The Kremlin’s directive to cease investigation of the abuses committed 
in Novye Aldi provides a good example of impunity achieved through the 
direct demands of the Kremlin. Russian reporter Anna Politkovskaya 
carefully detailed the civilian atrocity in Novye Aldi, which remains 
beyond the grasp of the criminal justice system because of the direct 
demands of the Kremlin.129 Russian soldiers entered the town in December 
of 1999, only to find that the Chechen rebel fighters had already fled the 
city.130 Nevertheless, the Russian forces unleashed a violent assault on the 
civilians remaining in the town, bombing the village for an entire 
month.131 At least seventy-five civilians were killed and the village was 
demolished.132 One year after the atrocity there still had been no 
investigation.133 Not a single witness had been interviewed.134 Original 
death certificates were collected and reissued with no entry for “cause of 
death.”135 The prosecutor’s office told the victims that they were 
“monitoring the situation.”136 Others who inquired were told that an 
investigation is impossible because Chechen custom does not allow bodies 
to be exhumed.137 Some in the prosecutor’s office, speaking anonymously, 
said there was “pressure from the very highest authority and orders have 
been given to halt the investigation.”138 Putin did not want to enrage 
 126. POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62, at 116–19. 
 127. Radyuhin, supra note 119. 
 128. Ian Traynor, Moscow Makes Heroes of its War Generals, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 29, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 25755241; See also Oral Intervention at the 57th Session of the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Mar. 2001, available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
press/2001/04/un_oral9_0405.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Oral Intervention]. 
 129. POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62, at 309. 
 130. See id. at 309–15. 
 131. Id. at 310. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 313. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 314. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 314–15. 
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military leaders.139 There were also claims that military officials 
threatened prosecutors not to investigate.140 In this case, through direct 
demands, the Kremlin granted impunity upon those responsible for the 
atrocity. 
The second barrier to the effective operation of the Russian criminal 
justice system is the half-hearted nature of investigations undertaken by 
government prosecutors and investigators.141 Prosecutors appear willing to 
abandon inquiries against servicemen at the first minor bump in the 
investigation.142 In addition, investigations are often “incomplete, 
haphazard, or suspended altogether.”143 There are often unexplained 
delays in investigations and only weak attempts to locate witnesses, 
victims, and evidence.144 For example, the Russian human rights 
organization Memorial Human Rights Center documented a case in which 
a military prosecutor was investigating the disappearance of three young 
Chechen men.145 The Russian soldiers who were suspected in their 
disappearance refused to appear before the prosecutor for questioning.146 
Instead of pursuing the soldiers, the prosecutor determined that the crime 
was committed by “unidentified individuals in camouflage uniforms” 
whose identities “could not be established.”147 The case was then closed.148 
This incident is illustrative of a much wider pattern of incomplete 
investigations.149 
Thus, the reality of the situation is that the Russian criminal system is, 
in the majority of cases, unable to impose accountability on those 
responsible for atrocities committed against Chechen civilians. In light of 
the dismal prospects for prosecution from the Russian criminal system, 
 139. Id. at 315. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Crowfoot, supra note 95, at 320. 
 142. See, e.g., MEMORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, The Status of Investigations Into Crimes 
Against Civilians Committed by Representatives of Federal Forces on the Territory of the Chechen 
Republic During the Course of Military Action 1999–2001, (May 2001), available at 
http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/texts/status.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 143. Oral Intervention, supra note 128. 
 144. See, e.g., Isayeva, supra note 56. 
 145. MEMORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, supra note 142. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See, e.g., EVANGELISTA, supra note 24, at 155 (noting that two years into the second war 
Chechen civilians had filed more than 1000 complaints with the proper authorities, from these 
complaints, only eleven solders were convicted of crimes); see also Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, 
supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56. In these cases, the European Court of Human Rights 
described the insufficient efforts taken by Russian prosecutors and investigators to resolve the 
applicants’ complaints of criminal violations. 
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many victims have given up on criminal justice and now seek civil 
damages in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg.150 The 
international criminal law system, however, also provides another possible 
avenue for pursuing criminal prosecution.151 This system has been 
developed with the aim of stepping in to provide criminal justice when the 
domestic system cannot. The next Part of this Note will examine some of 
the breaches of international criminal law committed by Russian soldiers, 
military officers, and government officials. 
III. BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Despite clear violations of the Russian Criminal Code, the Russian 
criminal justice system has proven incapable of imposing criminal 
accountability on those responsible for atrocities committed in 
Chechnya.152 However, when the domestic crime also constitutes an 
international crime, the international criminal law system is designed to 
fill the gaps left by the domestic system. This Part will demonstrate that, in 
addition to Russian criminal law, the abhorrent acts of the individuals 
responsible for atrocities in Chechnya also constitute breaches of 
international criminal law. In particular, I will show that individual 
Russian soldiers, military officers, and government officials have breached 
international criminal law by committing both war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
A. War Crimes 
War crimes are “serious violations” of customary international law153 
or treaty law that have been criminalized.154 Generally, two requirements 
 150. Crowfoot, supra note 95, at 322; see also supra notes 3, 56, 144; Akayeva v. Russia, (No. 
57945/00) Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); Malcolm 
Hawkes, A Tribunal for Chechnya?, MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66306279. 
 151. See infra Part III. 
 152. See supra notes 111–49. 
 153. Customary international law is an international practice or norm that has become binding on 
states over time. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44–48 (4th ed. 2003). 
An international practice becomes customary international law when two conditions are met. Id. First, 
the practice must be a general practice. Id. at 46. Second, states must comply with the practice out of a 
sense of legal obligation. Id. When these two conditions are met, the customary international law will 
bind those states who did not dissent during its formation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 101 cmt. b (1987). The development of customary international law is a 
complicated process that is beyond the scope of this Note. It is sufficient to note, however, that many 
international criminal laws are widely held to be customary international law. JANIS, supra, at 48. 
 154. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47 (2003). 
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must be met for a serious violation of international law to be considered a 
war crime: (1) there must be a “serious infringement of an international 
rule” contained in an applicable treaty or a customary international law; 
and (2) “the violation must entail . . . the individual criminal responsibility 
of the person breaching the rule.”155 These two requirements ensure that 
the international rule has been criminalized and therefore that breach of 
the rule constitutes a war crime.156 This section will show that Russian 
soldiers, military officers, and government officials committed war crimes 
through serious breaches of international treaty law. In reaching this 
conclusion, the section will proceed in two subsections. The first 
subsection will identify the relevant treaty law and examine how it applies 
to the atrocities committed in Chechnya. The second subsection will assess 
how the treaty operates to impose accountability on the individuals 
responsible for serious breaches. 
The first step in identifying the heinous acts committed by Russian 
soldiers, military officers, and government officials during the two 
Chechen wars as war crimes is to find a “serious infringement of an 
international rule” that is contained in a treaty or customary law.157 The 
relevant international rules covering the Chechen atrocities are contained 
in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (hereinafter “Geneva Convention”).158 The 
Geneva Convention is a multilateral treaty signed by a majority of states in 
the world.159 The Soviet Union ratified the treaty in 1954.160 As the 
 155. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, (No. IT-94-1/AR72), Appeals Chamber, (Oct. 2, 
1995), at http://www.icty.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2004)). Under Tadić, there are three requirements: 
(1) the war crime must be a “serious infringement” of an international rule; (2) the rule must be 
derived from an international treaty or customary international law; and (3) the violation must entail 
the imposition of individual criminal responsibility. Id. For purposes of this Note, requirements (1) and 
(2) have been combined. 
 156. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 50. 
 157. Id. (citing Tadić, supra note 155). 
 158. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War, Oct. 21, 
1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. Russia ratified the Geneva Convention in 
1954. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, States Party to the Geneva Conventions 
and Their Additional Protocols, (Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org (last visited Oct. 28, 
2004) [hereinafter ICRC]. Because Russia is a party to the Geneva Convention, it is bound by its 
provisions and will be liable for any breaches. JANIS, supra note 153, at 9–16. In addition, Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Convention is now considered customary international law, and would be binding on 
Russia even if it were not a party to the treaty. THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 
238–39 (1998). The ICJ explicitly recognized Article 3 as customary international law. Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 114 (June 27). 
 159. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note 158. Geneva Convention ratification 
information is available at http://www.icrc.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 160. ICRC, supra note 158. 
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successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia became bound by the terms of 
the treaty.161  
Within the Geneva Convention, Article 3 and Additional Protocol II 
(hereinafter “Protocol II”) are the specific provisions that contain the 
relevant substantive international criminal rules.162 Article 3 and Protocol 
II are of particular importance for three reasons. First, these provisions 
contain rules specifically forbidding the types of atrocities committed in 
Chechnya.163 Second, these provisions address the treatment of civilians.164 
And finally, these provisions apply to internal conflicts.165 Article 3, in 
relevant part, states:  
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions: 
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members 
of armed forces who have laid down their arms . . . shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely . . .  
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time . . .  
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture . . .; 
(b) Taking of hostages; 
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating or 
degrading treatment; 
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court. . . .166 
 161. JANIS, supra note 153, at 9–10; see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN MURPHY, PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 126–28 (2002) (noting that Russia was accepted by the United 
Nations and other states as the “successor to the treaties to which the Soviet Union had been a party”). 
 162. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. Russia ratified Protocol II on September 29, 
1989. For ratification information see http://www.icrc.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 163. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3; Protocol II, supra note 162, arts. 4, 13, 14. 
 164. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3; Protocol II, supra note 162, arts. 4, 13, 14. 
 165. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3; Protocol II, supra note 162, arts. 4, 13, 14. 
 166. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3. 
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Protocol II elaborates on the types of acts forbidden. For example, 
Protocol II specifically prohibits pillaging and designates rape as a form of 
“[outrage] upon personal dignity.”167 Article 13 of Protocol II also 
provides that the “civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population 
are prohibited.”168 
Thus, the Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits the types of heinous 
acts that were committed against Chechen civilians.169 Acts such as 
murder, torture, and summary executions are specifically forbidden by the 
Geneva Convention.170 For example, Russian soldiers and military officers 
violated Protocol II’s prohibition on pillaging when they looted and 
destroyed the village of Alkhan-Yurt.171 Colonel Budanov violated Article 
3’s prohibition on “murder of all kinds” when he murdered Elza 
Kungayeva.172 Similarly, the 1999 Russian aerial bombing attack on a 
convoy of civilian refugees fleeing war-torn Grozny flagrantly violated 
both Article 3 and Protocol II’s prohibitions on violence to life and person, 
and also constituted an attack on a civilian population under Article 13 of 
Protocol II.173 These are just a few examples of the many atrocities 
committed against Chechen civilians in violation of the Geneva 
Convention. 
Violations of Article 3 and Protocol II are generally considered to be 
serious infringements of international rules when “the international 
community would have an important interest in prosecuting the violators, 
especially when the criminal justice system of the state where the offenses 
were committed . . . [has] failed to act.”174 In the case of atrocities in 
Chechnya, the international community has periodically expressed outrage 
at the mistreatment of Chechen civilians and the failure to prosecute those 
responsible.175 For example, the Council of Europe issued a draft 
 167. Protocol II, supra note 162, art. 4.2 (e), (g). 
 168. Id. art. 13.2. 
 169. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3; Protocol II, supra note 162, arts. 4, 13, 14. 
 170. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3. 
 171. See supra notes 123–26; Protocol II, supra note 162, art. 4.2(g). This incident was first 
mentioned in Part II.B. 
 172. See supra notes 90–95; Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3.1(a). 
 173. Isayeva, supra note 56; Yusupova, supra note 56; Bazayeva, supra note 56; Geneva 
Convention, supra note 158, art. 3.1(a); Protocol II, supra note 162, art. 4.2(a).  
 174. MERON, supra note 158, at 260; see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 4 [hereinafter the 
ICTR Statute]. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute adopts Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Protocol 
II as its definition for war crimes. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Commission Censures Russia for Rights Abuses in 
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resolution criticizing the failure of the Russian domestic system to 
prosecute those responsible for the atrocities.176  
In addition to prohibiting many of the violent acts committed by 
Russian soldiers, military officers, and government officials, the Geneva 
Convention is also relevant because it specifically addresses the 
mistreatment of civilians. Section 1 of Article 3 specifically notes that the 
Article addresses criminal acts committed against “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities. . . .”177 Similarly, Protocol II also addresses 
the treatment of “[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or who have 
ceased to take part in hostilities.”178 The atrocities addressed in this Note 
are those committed against Chechen civilians. Therefore, the Geneva 
Convention, and in particular Article 3 and Protocol II, provide applicable 
international rules. 
The Geneva Convention is also applicable to the Chechen atrocities 
because it specifically addresses internal armed conflict.179 Article 3 
applies only “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character.”180 Because Chechnya is a republic of Russia and not a 
sovereign state, the conflict is not of an international character.181 In 
Chechnya, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 21, 2002, at 4, available at 2001 WL 4854032. The U.N. 
Human Rights Commission condemned the Russian atrocities on several occasions and expressed 
concern over the lack of investigations by Russia. Id. In addition, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also condemned Russian atrocities and the clampdown on the civilian 
population, urging a legal probe. OSCE Chief Raps Russia Over Chechnya, Moldova, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24769697. 
 176. Hawkes, supra note 150. The Council even went one step further, calling for the creation of 
an International Tribunal to prosecute those who committed war crimes under the Geneva Convention. 
Id. 
 177. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3. 
 178. Protocol II, supra note 162, art. 4.1. 
 179. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3. Protocol II does not specifically state that it 
applies to “internal armed conflict.” See generally Protocol II, supra note 162. Article 1 of Protocol II, 
however, indicates that the Protocol supplements Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which, as noted 
above, applies to internal armed conflict. Id. art. 1. Furthermore, Protocol II states that it applies to 
“[a]rmed [c]onflicts . . . which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces . . . or other organized armed groups. . . .” Id. 
 180. Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3. Also, Protocol II states that the Protocol “shall 
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.” Protocol II, supra note 162, 
art. 1. This provision merely reinforces the requirement in Article 3 that there must be an actual armed 
conflict. 
 181. The First Chechen War was fought with the aim of achieving Chechen sovereignty. See 
supra notes 22–28. The war ended with the Khasavyurt Peace Accords that purported to give 
Chechnya provisional independence. See supra note 40. Ultimately, however, the question of status 
was delayed until 2001. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. In the period after the first war, 
however, no countries or the U.N. recognized Chechnya as a sovereign state. Dmitry Litvinovich, 
Chechnya: Information, PRAVDA ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2002, at http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/2002/ 
11/14/39481.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). Chechnya never gained full sovereignty; therefore the 
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addition, the conflict is generally considered to be an “armed conflict.”182 
As noted above, the First Chechen War was fought over Chechen 
independence.183 The Second Chechen War began as an attempt to contain 
Chechen rebels after an incursion into Daghestan, and then melded into a 
war to reassert Russian control over the republic.184 In both wars, heavily 
armed Russian military forces invaded Chechnya.185 Thousands of 
uniformed soldiers were dispatched, bombers were employed to drop 
bombs over towns, missiles were targeted at selected sites, and tanks 
rolled into suspected rebel strongholds.186 Based on these facts, it seems 
evident that the Chechen Wars are correctly classified as “armed 
conflicts.”187  
The second step in successfully characterizing the Chechen atrocities 
as war crimes is establishing that individual criminal responsibility can be 
imposed for a serious breach of the international rule.188 In this case, it is 
necessary to establish that Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva 
Convention impose individual criminal responsibility. Admittedly, nothing 
in the Geneva Convention itself refers specifically to individual criminal 
responsibility.189 However, the view held by the majority of the world 
conflict was not of an international character and thus falls within Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. 
 182. See infra notes 183–87 and accompanying text.  
 183. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 185. Russian Troops Inside Chechnya, CNN, Oct. 1, 1999, available at http://www.cnn.com/ 
WORLD/europe/9910/01/russia.chechnya.02 (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). See generally Cornell, supra 
note 16, at 170–74. 
 186. Yuri v. Ushakov, Humanitarian and Legal Aspects of the Crisis in Chechnya, 23 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1155, 1164 (2000).  
 187. In an attempt to avoid liability under the 1949 Geneva Convention, the Kremlin has 
attempted to define the conflict as a “counter-terrorist operation,” rather than an internal armed 
conflict. See, e.g., Thomas Marzahl, Keep Anti-Terrorism Campaign Within International Law, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2331527. 
 One Russian official, testifying before the European Union, described Chechnya as an “aggressive 
center of international terrorism and political extremism.” EU Council Chairman: Russian EU 
Membership Possible in ‘Not Too Distant Future,’ DIE PRESSE (Vienna), Aug. 28, 2001 (in German), 
available at www.ichkeria.org/a/2001/8/new2908-en85218.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). However, 
as noted in Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, the determination of whether a conflict is an “armed 
conflict” is an objective judgment. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, (No. ICTR-96-4-T), Trial 
Chamber, (Sept. 2, 1998), para. 603, at http://www.ictr.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) (holding “on the 
basis of objective criteria, both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II will apply once it has 
been established there exists an internal armed conflict which fulfills their respective pre-determined 
criteria.”). Therefore, it would be irrelevant how the Kremlin characterizes the conflict. Id. A thorough 
analysis of the Kremlin’s claim is beyond the scope of this Note. But, for the purposes of this Note, I 
will assume the more likely conclusion that Russian military actions in Chechnya constitute an “armed 
conflict.” 
 188. See supra note 155. 
 189. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note 158. 
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today is that individual criminal responsibility is created under Article 3 
and Protocol II of the Geneva Convention.190 For example, several 
international criminal tribunals created to prosecute war crimes have found 
that Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Convention impose individual 
criminal responsibility.191 The International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (hereinafter “Nuremberg Tribunal”) concluded that an absence 
of provisions concerning punishment for breaches in a given international 
rule does not prevent a finding of individual responsibility.192 The 
Nuremberg Tribunal ultimately ruled that “[c]rimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.”193 More recently, the statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR”) also specifies that 
individuals may be tried for breaches of Article 3 and Protocol II of the 
Geneva Convention.194 In addition, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”), in Tadić, affirmed that both Article 3 
and Protocol II impose individual criminal responsibility.195  
Accepting that Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Convention 
impose accountability on individuals, it is necessary to identify the 
individuals who can be held accountable. Under the doctrine of command 
responsibility, not only is the individual who actually perpetrated the 
crime held responsible, but also those military officers and government 
officials who ordered or facilitated the criminal activity.196 The doctrine of 
command responsibility would impose liability on a Chechen 
 190. For example, Meron contends that “[t]hose who reject common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II as a basis for individual criminal responsibility tend to confuse criminality with jurisdiction 
and penalties.” MERON, supra note 158, at 239. Dissenters argue that until customary law has 
established that Article 3 and Protocol II create individual criminal responsibility, the principle of 
nullem crimen sine lege prevents their application. Id. at 235–38. 
 191. See infra notes 192–95. 
 192. MERON, supra note 158, at 190; see also INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, THE TRIAL 
OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Nuremburg, 14 
November 1945–1 October 1946, Part 22, at 445, 467 (1950). 
 193. Id. at 447. 
 194. ICTR Statute, supra note 174, arts. 4, 7. 
 195. Tadić, supra note 155, para. 129 (“we have no doubt that [breaches of Article 3] entail 
individual criminal responsibility, regardless of whether they are committed in internal or international 
armed conflicts.”). 
 196. JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEPHEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE 424 (3d ed. 
2003). Jones and Powles note that the idea of command responsibility was first clearly articulated and 
used by the Nuremberg Tribunal following World War II. Id. Under this doctrine, in certain 
circumstances civilian and military commanders will be held responsible for the criminal actions of 
their subordinates. Id. For a more detailed explanation of the development and implementation of the 
doctrine of command responsibility, see id. at 424–44. 
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commanding officer or government official who knew, or should have 
known, that his subordinates were about to commit one of the criminal 
acts articulated in the Geneva Convention, and failed to take action to 
prevent the crime.197 There is some dispute as to whether Article 3 and 
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention allow for command 
responsibility.198 However, both the ICTY and the ICTR have incorporated 
command responsibility into their statutes and apply that doctrine to 
Article 3 and Protocol II.199 The ICTY appellate chamber specifically took 
up the issue in 2003.200 The appellate chamber affirmed that command 
responsibility does apply to breaches of Article 3 and Protocol II.201 
Thus, it appears that military officers and government officials, as well 
as individual soldiers can be prosecuted for war crimes under Article 3 and 
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention.202 For example, in the case of the 
mass murder and destruction at Alkhan-Yurt, the following military 
parties could be prosecuted for war crimes: (1) the individual soldiers 
responsible for the actual murders and pillaging, (2) General Shamanov, 
who was responsible for the troops and allowed the atrocity to occur, and 
(3) any Russian political leaders who had knowledge of the abuses but 
failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent it.203  
 197. Id. Jones and Powles note that both the ICTR and the ICTY statutes adopt the doctrine of 
command responsibility. See ICTR Statute, supra note 174, art. 6.3 (the fact that any violation “was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility . . .”); Statute 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (1993), art. 7.3, (amended by U.N. SCOR Res. 1166, 1329, and 1411) [hereinafter ICTY 
Statute] (the fact that any violation “was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of 
criminal responsibility . . .”). In addition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also 
provides for command responsibility. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 
2002, art. 28, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter the ICC 
Statute] (stating, “A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes . . . committed by forces under his or her effective command and 
control” and in any other non-military superior and subordinate relationships “a superior shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes . . . committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority 
and control . . .”). For more detailed analysis of command responsibility in these tribunals, see JONES 
& POWLES, supra note 196, at 424–34, 441–42. 
 198. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 430–35.  
 199. ICTY Statute, supra note 197, art. 7; ICTR Statute, supra note 174, art. 6. Both the ICTY 
Statute and the ICTR Statute incorporate Article 3 of the Geneva Convention into their war crimes 
provisions. Thus, the doctrine of command responsibility applies to Article 3 breaches. See also JONES 
& POWLES, supra note 196, at 408–12. 
 200. See Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović et al., (No. IT-01-47-AR72), Appeals Chamber, (July 16, 
2003), at http://www.icty.org/Supplement/supp43-e/hadzihasanovic.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 201. Id. The Appeals Chamber ruled that “the fact that it was in the course of an internal armed 
conflict that a war crime was about to be committed or was committed is not relevant to the 
responsibility of the commander.” Id. para. 20. 
 202. See supra notes 188–201 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
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This discussion demonstrates that individual Russian soldiers, military 
officers, and government officials have committed war crimes through 
serious breaches of international criminal law embodied in Article 3 and 
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention. Torture in filtration camps, 
pillaging of towns, summary execution of prisoners, and raping of 
villagers all constitute war crimes capable of prosecution under the 
Geneva Convention. As a result, Chechen victims of these war crimes may 
seek justice in the international criminal system. The problem is whether a 
tribunal exists with competence to prosecute these crimes. That issue is 
addressed in Part IV below. 
B. Crimes Against Humanity 
Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity are not codified in 
international treaty law.204 Instead, the substantive aspects of the offense 
have developed over time to become customary international law.205 
Because crimes against humanity are not definitively codified, courts and 
tribunals are able to inject slight nuances into the definitions of crimes 
against humanity they choose to adopt.206 Generally, however, crimes 
against humanity can be described as “serious [attacks] on human dignity” 
that are part of a “widespread or systematic practice” directed toward the 
“civilian population.”207 This section will apply this definition to 
demonstrate that Russian soldiers, military officers, and government 
officials are responsible for crimes against humanity as a result of the 
atrocities they inflicted upon Chechen civilians. In making this assertion, 
this section is broken down into four subsections. The first subsection will 
explore what constitutes a “serious attack on human dignity” and assess 
whether such attacks have occurred in Chechnya.208 The second subsection 
will examine the requirement of a “widespread or systematic practice” and 
will apply that definition to the situation in Chechnya.209 The third 
subsection will briefly address the requirement that the attacks be directed 
 204. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 64. 
 205. Id. at 64–65; see also MERON, supra note 158, at 233. 
 206. Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 174, art. 3, with ICTY Statute, supra note 197, art. 5. The 
ICTR Statute requires a widespread or systematic attack based on “national, political, ethnic, racial, or 
religions grounds.” ICTR Statute, supra note 174, art. 3. The ICTY, however, only requires 
discrimination if the charge is persecution. ICTY Statute, supra note 197, art. 5. 
 207. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 64. It should also be noted that under customary international 
law, crimes against humanity can unquestionably be committed in the context of an internal armed 
conflict, such as the Chechen Wars. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 185–86. 
 208. See supra notes 204–07; see infra notes 209–25. 
 209. See infra notes 226–60. 
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toward a “civilian population.”210 Finally, the fourth subsection will 
address which individuals can be held responsible for crimes against 
humanity.211 
1. Elements of a Serious Attack on Human Dignity 
In order for Russian forces and government officials to be held 
responsible for crimes against humanity, they must have committed 
“serious [attacks] on human dignity.”212 Ten specific criminal acts have 
been singled out as serious attacks on human dignity: (1) murder; (2) 
extermination; (3) enslavement; (4) deportation; (5) imprisonment; (6) 
torture; (7) sexual violence; (8) persecution; (9) forced disappearance; and 
(10) other inhumane acts of a similar character and gravity.213 These 
criminal acts have been defined as serious attacks on human dignity by 
both the case law put forth by the various international tribunals that have 
operated since World War II and the statutes of those tribunals.214 Many of 
 210. See infra notes 261–67. 
 211. See infra notes 268–70. 
 212. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 64. 
 213. Id. at 74–80; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 174, art. 3; ICTY Statute, supra note 197, art. 
5; ICC Statute, supra note 197, art. 7. 
 214. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 74. For case law on extermination, Cassese cites Kambanda v. 
Prosecutor, (No. ICTR-97-23-A), Appeals Chamber, (Oct. 19, 2000), at http://www.ictr.org (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2005). 
 For case law on enslavement, Cassese cites Prosecutor v. Kunarac and Others, (No. IT-96-23), 
Trial Chamber, (Feb. 22, 2001), para. 539, at http://www.un.org/icty/Kunarac/trialc2/judgement/Kun-
tj010222e-1.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (holding “enslavement as a crime against humanity in 
customary international law [consists] of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership over a person.”). 
 For case law on deportation, Cassese cites Prosecutor v. Krstić, (No. IT-98-33-T), Trial Chamber, 
(Aug. 2, 2001), para. 521, at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/trialC1/judgement/krs-tj010802e-1.htm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2005) (“deportation . . . relate[s] to the involuntary and unlawful evacuation of 
individuals from the territory in which they reside” to another country). 
 For case law on imprisonment, Cassese cites Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, (No. IT-95-14/2-T), 
Trial Chamber, (Feb. 26, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty.kordic/trialc/judgement/kor-tj010226e-
1.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (“the term imprisonment . . . should be understood as arbitrary 
imprisonment, that is to say, the deprivation of liberty of the individual without due process of law, as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”).  
 For case law on torture, Cassese cites Prosecutor v. Delalić and Others, (No. IT-96-21-T), Trial 
Chamber, (Nov. 16, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/cel-tj981116e-1.htm 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2005). Defining torture as: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/10
p1553 Powderly book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004]   SHORTCOMINGS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1577 
 
 
 
 
 
 
these enumerated criminal acts mirror those provided in the Geneva 
Convention as war crimes.215 In fact, international criminal law makes “no 
distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of 
a war crime.”216 Thus, once a criminal act is found to be a war crime, it has 
met the “serious attack on human dignity” requirement for crimes against 
humanity.217  
Reports from Chechnya indicate that Russian forces have committed 
serious attacks against the human dignity of Chechen civilians.218 One 
stark example of such an attack is the torture of Chechen civilians sent to 
Russian filtration camps. The case of Zelimkham is illustrative.219 Fifteen 
Russian military policemen took Zelimkham from his home to the 
International filtration camp.220 At the camp, guards severely beat and 
sodomized him to coerce him into signing a confession stating that he was 
a Chechen rebel fighter.221 Customary international criminal law has 
Id. para. 456. 
 For case law on sexual violence, Cassese cites Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 187, para. 10A 
(“acts of sexual violence include forcible sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a 
penis and/or of the vagina or anus by some other object, and sexual abuse, such as forced nudity.”). 
 For case law on persecution, Cassese cites Prosecutor v. Kupreškić and Others, (No. IT-95-16-T), 
Trial Chamber, (Oct. 6, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/kup-tj000114e-
1.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (defining persecution as “the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory 
grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same 
level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5” of the ICTY Statute). 
 Finally, Cassese notes that forced disappearance is defined by the ICC statute, supra note 197, art. 
7(2)(i): 
“Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, 
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on 
the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the 
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 
Id. In addition, the ICC Statute also defines other inhumane acts. Id. art. 7(1)(k) (defining inhumane 
acts as “intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health.”). 
 215. See Geneva Convention, supra note 158, art. 3; Protocol II, supra note 162. 
 216. Prosecutor v. Tadić, (No. IT-94-1-T), Appeals Chamber, (May 7, 1997), para. 69, at 
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-asj000126e.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005), cited in 
JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 183. 
 217. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 185–86. If a Russian soldier is convicted of a war crime 
for the rape of a Chechen woman, he has also committed a serious attack against the human dignity of 
that woman. Id. This satisfies the first requirement for breach of a crime against humanity. Id. 
 218. See generally POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62; see also infra notes 219–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 219. Torture in the OSCE Region: Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 106th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2000) (testimony of Maureen Greenwood, Advocacy Director, Europe 
and the Middle East, Amnesty International), available at http://www.csce.gov/pdf/062200brf.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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defined torture as consisting of the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering in order to punish, intimidate, discriminate, or obtain information 
or a confession.222 Here Zelimkham endured severe physical pain and 
suffering through the beatings and sodomy.223 The torture was intended to 
extract a confession of involvement with the Chechen rebels.224 The 
treatment of Zelimkham thus constitutes a serious attack against human 
dignity in the form of torture. This is just one example of the many 
Chechens who endured torture in the Russian filtration camps and a single 
case of countless serious attacks against the human dignity of Chechen 
civilians.225  
2. Widespread or Systematic Practice 
The existence of a serious attack on human dignity is not enough, 
however, to constitute a crime against humanity.226 The serious attack on 
human dignity must also be part of a widespread or systematic practice 
directed toward a civilian population.227 To constitute a crime against 
humanity, the offense cannot be “limited to a sporadic event” but rather, 
must “be part of a pattern of misconduct.”228 A widespread attack is one 
that is “directed against a multiplicity of victims.”229 A crime may be 
“widespread” by the “cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the 
singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude.”230 On the 
other hand, a systematic attack is one that is “carried out pursuant to a 
preconceived policy or plan.”231 There are generally four requirements that 
must be met for an attack to be considered systematic: (1) there must be a 
political objective or plan behind the attacks; (2) the criminal acts must be 
either “on a very large scale against a group of civilians” or “repeated and 
continuous” acts linked to one another; (3) there must be substantial use of 
public or private resources, such as the military; and (4) high level 
 222. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 187, para. 681. 
 223. See supra note 219. 
 224. See supra note 219. 
 225. See supra note 219; see also POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62, at 311–12. 
 226. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 227. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 64. 
 228. Id. at 65. 
 229. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, (No. ICTR-95-1-T), Trial Chamber, (May 21, 1999), 
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/KayRuz/judgement/index.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004), 
cited in JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 192. 
 230. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, (No. IT-95-1-T), Trial Chamber, (Mar. 3, 2000), para. 206, at 
http://www.icty.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2004), cited in JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 192. 
 231. Kayishema, supra note 229, para. 123, cited in JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 192. 
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government officials or military officers must be involved in the creation 
of the political objective or plan.232 
To demonstrate a widespread or systematic attack, it is not necessary to 
affirmatively establish the existence of a formal state plan or policy to 
target a civilian population.233 Rather, a policy or plan can be inferred 
from the pattern of inhumane acts that occurred.234 When attacks on 
human dignity occur on a widespread or systematic basis, that alone 
demonstrates a policy or plan to commit the acts, regardless of whether it 
is formalized.235 Thus, as a practical matter, requirements (1) and (4) for 
establishing a “systematic” attack are considered fulfilled when 
requirements (2) and (3) have been met.236 
The Kremlin and the Russian media are largely silent on the extent of 
the attacks targeting Chechen civilians. However, the European Parliament 
has issued a comprehensive account of the large-scale nature of the attack 
on Chechen civilians.237 There have been at least four documented mass 
killings of Chechen civilians in the second war.238 These include the 
atrocities committed in Alkhan-Yurt, Staropromyslovsky, Novye Aldi, and 
Mesker-Yurt.239 These four incidents resulted in the mass murder of more 
than 150 Chechen civilians, the majority shot at close range.240 In addition 
to these mass murders, mass graves have been found in Chechnya.241 The 
largest mass grave held fifty-one bodies, and several smaller graves have 
also been discovered.242 Individual corpses are routinely found along the 
road, in open fields and forests, and in shallow graves.243 An undetermined 
number of Chechens have simply “disappeared.”244 Chechen President 
Akhmad Kadyrov recently estimated that 3,000 Chechens have 
 232. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 192 (citing Blaškić, supra note 230, para. 203). 
 233. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 195–96 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, (No. IT-94-1-T), 
Trial Chamber, (May 7, 1997), para. 653, at http://www.icty.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (holding a 
policy of widespread and systematic attack “need not be formalized and can be deduced from the way 
in which the acts occur. . .”)); Kayishema, supra note 229, para. 126 (holding an informal plan 
“instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group” is sufficient to meet the 
requirement of a political objective or plan). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Blaškić, supra note 232, para. 204. 
 237. Human Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic, supra note 59. The European parliament is 
the legislative body of the European Union.  
 238. Id. para. 13. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at paras. 14–24. 
 241. Id. para. 25. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. para. 34. 
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disappeared since the Second Chechen War began in 1999.245 The 
Chechen rebel health minister puts the number of the disappeared at 
20,000.246 In addition, torture and rape of civilians is also commonplace, 
especially in the filtration camps.247 An accurate number of civilians 
killed, disappeared, or otherwise forced to endure serious attacks on 
human dignity might never be available. However, most reports estimate 
the number to be at least 20,000 and potentially as high as 200,000.248 
Based on this evidence, it appears that the attack on Chechen civilians 
seems to be both widespread and systematic.249 The attack appears to be 
widespread because it is directed at a multiplicity of victims.250 
Specifically, it is likely that at least 20,000 civilians were killed or have 
disappeared at the hands of Russian forces.251 The cumulative effect of the 
murders, disappearances, rapes, and torture indicate a widespread pattern 
of targeting Chechen civilians.252 The attack can also be characterized as 
systematic.253 The Kremlin and military officials have not formally 
announced a plan or policy of targeting Chechen civilians; however such a 
plan can be inferred from the repeated and continuous attacks targeted 
toward the civilian population.254 Moreover, substantial public resources 
have been used to target Chechen civilians.255 For example, Russian 
military forces are used to torture and kill civilians in the filtration camps, 
which themselves were built with public funds.256  
 245. 3,000 Disappeared in Chechnya, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 19, 2004, at 21, available at 
2004 WL 73457024. 
 246. Chechen Rebel Health Minister Calls on U.N. to Broker Talks with Russia, BBC 
MONITORING (Caucasus), Jan. 23, 2004. 
 247. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text; see also Human Rights Situation in the 
Chechen Republic, supra note 59, at paras. 40–44. 
 248. Nichols, supra note 20, at 250. Nichols notes that the Chechen government estimates 25,000 
to 40,000 civilian deaths or disappearances as of May 2000. Id. at 250 n.15; see also PROJECT 
PLOUGHSHARES, Armed Conflict Report 2004: Russia (Chechnya), at http://www.ploughshares.ca/ 
CONTENT/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-Russia.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2004); AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, Catastrophe in Chechnya: Escaping the Quagmire, (Dec. 
2003), available at http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.675/summary.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 
2004); Martin Sieff, Analysis: Putin Fires Generals Over Chechnya, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 2004, 
available at http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040719-041142-8528r.htm (last visited Feb. 
8, 2005). 
 249. See supra notes 238–48 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 238–48 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 238–48 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (explaining that the use of Russian armed 
forces and the construction of Russian filtration camps constitutes expenditures of substantial public 
resources). 
 256. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
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The “widespread and systematic” requirement also has implications 
regarding the required intent of the accused. To be found guilty of crimes 
against humanity, the accused must both “know that there is an attack on 
the civilian population” and “know that his act fits in with the attack.”257 It 
does not matter if the attack against human dignity was committed for 
purely personal reasons, provided the accused knew of the two conditions 
noted above.258 To satisfy the knowledge requirement, the accused must 
simply have “actual or constructive knowledge of the broader context of 
the attack.”259 It is of no consequence whether the accused actually 
“intended to support the regime carrying out the attack.”260 It is likely that 
individual Russian soldiers, military officers, and government officials 
were aware of a broader attack on the civilian population when individual 
attacks on human dignity were committed. However, ascertaining the 
intent of those responsible is an individualized inquiry best undertaken 
during an investigation and trial for crimes against humanity. 
3. Directed Toward a Civilian Population 
As noted above, crimes against humanity are serious attacks on human 
dignity directed at a “civilian population.”261 This requirement needs only 
brief explanation. “Civilians” are those who “are not taking any active part 
in the hostilities.”262 It appears that a large number of victims of the 
Chechen atrocities are civilians.263 They took no part in the hostilities and 
were victimized in their homes, on the streets, and at Russian 
 257. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 82; see also JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 197 (citing 
Tadić, supra note 233, para. 659 (holding “the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the 
civilian population, know that his act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely 
personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict.”)). 
 258. JONES & POWLES, supra note 192, at 197 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadić (No. IT-94-1/AR72), 
Appeals Chamber, (July 15, 1999), para. 255, at http://www.icty.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) 
(holding “crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons, provided it is 
understood that . . .” the perpetrator knew there was an attack on the civilian population and knew how 
his act fit in with the broader attack)). 
 259. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 198 (citing Kayishema, supra note 229, para. 134). 
 260. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 198 (citing Blaškić, supra note 230, at paras. 254–56). 
 261. See supra note 207. 
 262. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 189 (citing Akayesu, supra note 187, para. 582). 
 263. See generally POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 62; see also Cornell, supra note 16, at 172–74; 
Nichols, supra note 20, at 250. The Kremlin, however, vehemently denies that a large number of 
civilians have been killed in the fighting. See, e.g., In Chechnya, Tales of Victory, Horror, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WL 5598023; Civilian Casualties Mounting in 
Chechen Fighting, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Nov. 1, 1999, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/ 
1999/nov/chechb1101.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
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checkpoints.264 The determination of whether a “population” has been 
targeted is a subjective test.265 When the perpetrators themselves identify a 
specific group to target, that group constitutes a population for purposes of 
crimes against humanity.266 Observers have noted that Russian forces 
appear to target the entire ethnic Chechen population, indicating that 
Russian soldiers, military officers, and government officials do have a 
specific group they are targeting—ethnic Chechen civilians.267 The 
subjective considerations of the accused, however, are best assessed 
during an investigation and trial. 
4. Who Can Be Held Responsible 
Finally, it is necessary to specify who exactly may be held responsible 
for crimes against humanity. Similar to the development of war crimes as 
individual offenses, the various statutes and case law arising from the 
recent international criminal tribunals have solidified the notion that 
crimes against humanity are crimes perpetrated by individuals.268 In 
addition, international legal scholars, as well as the statutes and case law 
from these tribunals, have unanimously agreed that the doctrine of 
command responsibility applies to crimes against humanity committed 
during internal armed conflict.269 For example, the statutes of both the 
ICTY and the ICTR specify that individuals may be tried for crimes 
against humanity, and further provide that command responsibility will 
apply.270 As such, individual Russian soldiers directly responsible for 
 264. See supra note 263. 
 265. JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 190 (citing Prosecutor v. Nikolić, (No. IT-94-2-R61), 
Trial Chamber (Oct. 23, 2001), para. 26, at http://www.icty.org (last visited Oct. Jan. 5, 2005) (holding 
a civilian population is targeted when target population is “specifically identified as a group by the 
perpetrators” of the crimes against humanity)). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See, e.g., Rebel Web Site Carries Appeal for International Conference on Chechnya, BBC 
MONITORING (Caucasus), Dec. 28, 2003. 
 268. See ICTY Statute, supra note 197, art. 7 (“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred 
to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime”); ICTR 
Statute, supra note 174, art. 6 (“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of 
the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”); ICC Statute, supra note 197, art. 
25.2 (“A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”); see also Tadić, supra note 
258, para. 129. 
 269. See supra note 201 and accompanying text; see also JONES & POWLES, supra note 196, at 
408–12. 
 270. See supra note 268. 
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carrying out serious attacks on human dignity that they know to be part of 
a widespread or systematic pattern of attack targeted at the Chechen 
civilian population can be held accountable. In addition, military officers 
and government officials who explicitly or implicitly condoned, planned, 
or facilitated the widespread pattern of attacks on human dignity can also 
be held responsible for crimes against humanity.  
This part of the Note has identified possible breaches of international 
criminal law committed by Russian soldiers, military officers, and 
government officials during the Chechen Wars. In particular, I have 
argued that Chechen civilians have been the victims of both war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. The next part will identify and assess the 
courts and tribunals presently available to prosecute these crimes. 
IV. SEEKING JUSTICE 
Thus far this Note has established that Russian soldiers, military 
officers and government officials have breached international criminal 
law.271 Specifically, these individuals have committed various war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Unfortunately, simply establishing clear 
breaches of international law does not result in automatic criminal 
prosecution of those responsible. There must also be a court or tribunal 
with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for breaches of international 
criminal law. This part will explore the three types of tribunals currently 
available to prosecute breaches of international criminal law and explain 
the jurisdictional barriers that prevent each of these tribunals from 
providing criminal justice for Chechen victims. 
A. International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court (hereinafter “ICC”) is a permanent 
international criminal court created by multilateral treaty.272 The ICC was 
designed to provide criminal prosecution for “serious crimes of 
international concern” when domestic criminal systems are unable or 
unwilling.273 In particular, the ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute both war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.274 In spite of this, however, the ICC 
 271. See supra notes 153–270. 
 272. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 499 (2003). 
 273. Id. (citing ICC Statute, supra note 197, art. 1). 
 274. ICC Statute, supra note 197, art. 5 (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in 
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes. . . (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) 
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does not have jurisdiction to prosecute Russian nationals.275 This section 
will explore the sources of personal jurisdiction conferred under the treaty 
and explain why this jurisdiction does not reach Russian nationals. 
The ICC has two sources of jurisdiction.276 The first is jurisdiction 
based on consent.277 Consent is inferred when a state ratifies the ICC treaty 
and thereby becomes a party.278 Consequently, the ICC has consent-based 
jurisdiction when: (1) the crime occurred on the territory of a state that is a 
party to the treaty; or (2) the person accused is a national of a state that is a 
party to the treaty.279 Russia, expressing concern over encroachment on 
sovereign rights, has not ratified the ICC treaty.280 Therefore, the Court 
does not have consent-based jurisdiction over crimes committed in Russia 
or by Russian nationals.281  
The second source of jurisdiction is found under Article 13 of the ICC 
Statute.282 The ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute when a case has been 
“referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”283 This form of jurisdiction is 
not consent-based. If the Security Council decides to refer a case to the 
ICC prosecutor, the Court is not limited by whether or not the crime 
occurred on the territory of a state-party or whether the accused is a 
national of a state-party.284 Chapter VII bestows on the Security Council 
the power to take measures to ensure international peace and security.285 
Prior to the creation of the ICC, the Security Council acted under its 
Chapter VII powers to create international tribunals to prosecute war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia 
War crimes . . .”). 
 275. See infra notes 276–90. 
 276. ICC Statute, supra note 197, arts. 12, 13. 
 277. Id. art. 12 (“A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of 
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”). 
 278. Id.  
 279. Id. at art 12.2. 
 280. See Stanislav Kondrashov, Superpower and Superpeople, CDI RUSSIAN WEEKLY, July 10–
16, 2002, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/214-4.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004). For ICC 
ratification information, see http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005). 
Russia signed the treaty on September 13, 2003, but has yet to become a party through ratification. 
 281. ICC Statute, supra note 197, art. 12. 
 282. Id. art. 13. 
 283. Id. art. 13(b). 
 284. Id. art. 13; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 272, at 515. 
 285. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”). 
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and Rwanda.286 Because the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda were also 
internal armed conflicts of a nature similar to the conflict in Chechnya, it 
is likely the atrocities committed in Chechnya would also be considered a 
threat to international peace and security and therefore within the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII jurisdiction.287 In spite of this, it is unlikely the 
Security Council would refer crimes arising from the situation in 
Chechnya to the ICC. Any action of the Security Council under Chapter 
VII requires that the five permanent members act unanimously.288 Russia 
is a permanent member, and therefore it is doubtful that Russia would vote 
in favor of referring a crime involving one of its nationals to the ICC.289 
This would be tantamount to an admission that Russian domestic courts 
are incapable of providing justice.290 
Even if Russia were to agree in the Security Council to refer a criminal 
case to the ICC, the ICC only has jurisdiction to hear cases involving 
criminal acts occurring after the statute of the Court went into effect.291 
Thus, any crimes occurring before July 1, 2002 would not be under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.292 In sum, it appears that the ICC does not provide 
a viable forum to prosecute breaches of international law arising from the 
Chechen conflict. 
 286. ICTR Statute, supra note 174, at preamble (“As amended by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. . .”); ICTY Statute, supra note 197, at 
preamble (“Having been established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations . . .”). 
 287. MERON, supra note 158, at 228. 
 288. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. There are five permanent members on the Security Council: 
China, France, Russia, the United States, and Great Britain. Id. art. 23, para. 1. Each permanent 
member of the Security Council has the authority to veto any provision before it. Id. art. 27, para. 3. 
 289. Given Russia’s outrage at the suggestion by the Council of Europe that an international 
tribunal be formed to address crimes committed in Chechnya, it is unlikely Russia would vote in the 
Security Council for such a tribunal. See Mironov Rejects Idea of International Tribunal for Chechnya, 
ITAR TASS, May 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55521303. Chairman of the Federation Council, 
Sergei Mironov, stated that the Russian domestic criminal system is “in line with the ideals of the 
Council of Europe” and therefore does not need outside interference. Id.  
 290. Id. Mironov noted that “[a]ll the needed legal structures have been created in Chechnya. 
Courts and public prosecutor’s offices are working. Criminals are called to account without fail. . . . 
This is why any appeals for the creation of tribunal could only evoke perplexity. . . .” Id. Abandonment 
of these legal structures in favor of an international tribunal would indicate that these structures are 
inadequate. 
 291. ICC Statute, supra note 197, art. 11.1 (“The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to 
crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.”). 
 292. Id.; see also William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of 
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2002). The First Chechen War 
lasted from roughly 1994 through 1996. The Second Chechen War began in 1999 and came to an 
unofficial end in roughly 2001. See supra notes 30, 53, 57. Any crimes committed during the sporadic 
fighting that has ensued since July 1, 2002 could be tried by the ICC provided the Court was able to 
obtain jurisdiction over Russian nationals. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1553 Powderly book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1586 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1553 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. International Ad Hoc Tribunals 
International ad hoc tribunals are temporary tribunals created under the 
Security Council’s Chapter VII powers.293 Two recent international ad hoc 
tribunals are the ICTY and ICTR.294 Both of these tribunals were created 
to fill gaps left by the respective domestic criminal justice systems, which 
were incapable of effectively prosecuting those responsible for serious 
breaches of international law.295 Ad hoc tribunals consist of judges 
selected from the international community as a whole and have 
jurisdiction over only certain crimes committed during specific 
conflicts.296 In theory, an international ad hoc tribunal could be created to 
fill the void left by the failure of the Russian criminal system to prosecute 
those responsible for Chechen atrocities. In practice, however, the creation 
of such a tribunal is infeasible. This section will examine how 
international ad hoc tribunals are formed and explain why the formation 
process effectively bars the creation of a similar tribunal for Chechnya.  
International ad hoc tribunals can be created in two ways.297 The first is 
through a treaty.298 Russia could enter into a treaty with various other 
countries or the U.N. to create an international ad hoc tribunal with 
jurisdiction to prosecute serious breaches of international law occurring in 
Chechnya.299 This method of formation is unlikely to occur, however, 
because it requires the consent of Russia.300 As noted above, Russia is 
unlikely to consent to the formation of a tribunal to prosecute Russian 
nationals for atrocities committed in Chechnya because such consent 
would amount to an admission of serious shortcomings in the domestic 
criminal system.301 
 293. See infra notes 306–11 and accompanying text; see also ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 339–40 (2003). 
 294. BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 293, at 393–94. 
 295. See CASSESE, supra note 154, at 336, 339. 
 296. ICTR Statute, supra note 174, art. 1 (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the 
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed 
in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 . . .”); ICTY 
Statute, supra note 197, art. 1 (“The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.”). 
 297. BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 293, at 339. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. See supra notes 288–90 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 288–90 and accompanying text. 
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The second method requires the Security Council to act pursuant to its 
Chapter VII powers. As noted above, within Chapter VII, Article 39 of the 
U.N. Charter vests the Security Council with the power to take measures 
to ensure international peace and security.302 Article 41 further provides 
that the Security Council may decide what “measures not involving the 
use of armed force” are necessary to maintain that peace and security.303 In 
creating the ICTY and the ICTR, the Security Council acted under its 
Article 39 and 41 powers.304 Because this method of creation requires the 
action of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII, the problem of the 
veto resurfaces.305 Any resolution by the Security Council to form an 
international ad hoc tribunal for Chechnya must be unanimously accepted 
by the five permanent members.306 As noted above, it is unlikely Russia 
would admit to the incapacities of its own criminal system and vote for the 
creation of a tribunal.307  
In 2002, Ilyas Akhmadov, the Foreign Minister of Ichkeria, a republic 
within the Chechen Republic, called upon the U.N. General Assembly to 
create a tribunal for Chechnya akin to the ICTY and ICTR.308 To sidestep 
the inevitable Russian veto in the Security Council, Akhmadov called on 
the General Assembly to use its Article 22 powers under the U.N. Charter 
to create a “subsidiary organ.”309 The current structure of the U.N. Charter, 
 302. See supra note 285. 
 303. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. 
 304. BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 293, at 339–42. 
 305. See supra notes 288–90 and accompanying text. 
 306. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3 (“Decisions of the Security Council on all other [non-
procedural] matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members . . .”). 
 307. See supra notes 288–90 and accompanying text. Because of the veto power, the five 
permanent members of the Security Council can essentially insulate their nationals from facing 
accountability before an ad hoc tribunal. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27, para. 3. Many scholars have 
expressed concern with this problem. For example, Theodore Meron noted his unease “about the 
selectivity involved in a system where the establishment of a tribunal for a given conflict depends on 
whether consensus to apply Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter can be obtained.” MERON, supra note 
158, at 230. 
 308. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Official Statement, 
International Tribunal for Chechnya (Mar. 23, 2002), available at http://www.chechnya-mfa.info/ 
print_news.php?func=detail&par=49 (last visited Oct. 27, 2004); see also KAFKAS VAKFI CAUCASUS 
FOUNDATION, Call Upon U.N. to Found International Tribunal (Mar. 28, 2002), at 
http://www.kafkas.org.tr/english/ajans/2002/mart/28.03.2002_Call_upon_U_N_to_found_Internationa
l_tribunal.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2005). 
 The Council of Europe has also called upon the international community to consider creating an 
ad hoc tribunal to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity in Chechnya. See Human Rights 
Situation in Chechnya, EUR. PARL. RES. 1323 (Apr. 2, 2003), available at http://assembly.coe.int/ 
Documents/AdoptedText/TA03/ERES1323.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004). 
 309. See supra note 308. 
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however, does not provide the General Assembly with authority to create 
such a tribunal.  
Article 22 grants the General Assembly the power to “establish such 
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.”310 The words “necessary for the performance of its functions” 
provide an impossible barrier for Akhmadov. The General Assembly has 
no adjudicatory powers under the U.N. Charter.311 The General Assembly 
cannot create a subsidiary organ to perform a function that the General 
Assembly itself does not have the authority to perform.312 Thus, a 
subsidiary organ can be given judicial jurisdiction “on the national plane 
of [a] member State” only when the principle organ itself has that 
jurisdiction.313 Because the General Assembly does not have the authority 
under the U.N. Charter to exercise judicial powers over the territory of 
another state, it does not have the authority under Article 22 to create a 
subsidiary organ with criminal jurisdiction over the atrocities committed in 
Chechnya.314  
The Security Council, however, does have authority to create its own 
subsidiary organs with criminal jurisdiction.315 Like the General 
Assembly, the Security Council is granted authority under Article 29 to 
create “such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance 
of its functions.”316 However, unlike the General Assembly, the Security 
Council is granted adjudicatory powers under the U.N. Charter.317 These 
adjudicatory powers are found in Chapter VII.318 Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter confers on the Security Council the powers necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.319 This grant of power has been broadly 
interpreted to provide the Security Council with legislative, administrative, 
enforcement, and judicial powers that can be exercised by U.N. 
 310. U.N. CHARTER art. 22. Article 7 of the U.N. Charter provides that subsidiary organs may be 
established under the principle organs of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 2. The 
principle organs include the General Assembly and the Security Council. Id. art. 7, para. 1. 
 311. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 427, para. 22:25 (Bruno Simma ed., 
Oxford 2002). 
 312. Id. at 223, para. 7:24. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 223, para. 7:24, 427, para. 22:25. Simma states “Art[icle] 22 does not offer a sufficient 
legal basis to establish an International Court of Criminal Justice as a subsidiary organ. Article 22 only 
allows the transfer of such powers to subsidiary organs as the GA itself possess.” Id. at 427, para. 
22:25 (citations omitted). 
 315. Id. at 223, para. 7:24; see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 39, 41. 
 316. U.N. CHARTER art. 29. 
 317. See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 23–51. 
 318. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41. 
 319. See generally U.N. CHARTER chap. VII. 
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peacekeeping forces or subsidiary organs.320 The Security Council has 
used its Article 29 and Chapter VII powers in the past to establish the 
ICTY and ICTR discussed above.321 Specifically, these tribunals are 
subsidiary organs of the Security Council created under its Article 41 
powers to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed” in the maintenance of international peace and security.322 
As subsidiary organs, the tribunals are vested with the judicial power 
given to the Security Council under the broad grant of authority provided 
in Article 39 to maintain international peace and security.323  
In summary, Article 22 does not provide authority for the General 
Assembly to create an international tribunal with criminal jurisdiction.324 
The General Assembly simply does not have judicial powers under the 
U.N. Charter, and therefore is unable to create a subsidiary organ with 
such powers.325 In contrast, the Security Council does have adjudicatory 
powers and has used these powers to create the ICTY and the ICTR.326 To 
create an international tribunal under the U.N. with criminal jurisdiction 
for the crimes committed in Chechnya, action by the Security Council 
would be necessary.327 As noted above, with Russia’s veto power on the 
Security Council, such action is unlikely to occur.328 
C. Internationalized Domestic Courts 
Internationalized domestic courts are “judicial bodies that have a mixed 
composition.”329 The courts themselves sit in the state where the crimes 
occurred, but the judges are culled from both the domestic system and the 
international community.330 In addition, these mixed courts have 
jurisdiction to prosecute both international and domestic crimes.331 
 320. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY, supra note 311, at 223, para. 7:24, 
451, para. 24:20. 
 321. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. The Tadić opinion handed down by the ICTY has also affirmed that 
the Security Council has the jurisdiction to create such tribunals under its Article 41 powers to decide 
what “measures not involving the use of force” to employ. Tadić, supra note 155, at paras. 28–36. 
 322. U.N. CHARTER art. 41; CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY, supra note 
311, at 743, para. 41:19. 
 323. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY, supra note 311, at 223, para. 7:24. 
 324. See supra notes 310–14 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 310–14 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra notes 315–23 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 315–23 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 288–90 and accompanying text. 
 329. CASSESE, supra note 154, at 343. 
 330. Id. 
 331. BASSIOUNI, supra note 272, at 568. Thus, such courts are endowed with jurisdiction over the 
types of substantive crimes committed in Chechnya (i.e., war crimes and crimes against humanity). 
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Unfortunately, the methods used to form internationalized domestic courts 
have limited use in the case of Chechnya.332 This section will examine the 
two ways in which internationalized domestic courts can be formed and 
will explore why neither would be successful to create a mixed court to 
prosecute those responsible for atrocities committed in Chechnya. 
The first method used to create an internationalized domestic court is a 
treaty between the U.N. and the domestic government.333 The Sierra Leone 
Special Court was created in this manner.334 In the case of Sierra Leone, 
President Ahmed Tejan Kebbah explicitly asked the U.N. to join Sierra 
Leone in creating a tribunal to try those responsible for breaches of both 
international criminal law and Sierra Leone domestic law committed 
during the civil war.335 The Security Council then authorized the U.N. 
Secretary General to work with representatives from Sierra Leone to create 
the statute for the mixed tribunal.336 Thus, in order for this method to result 
in an internationalized domestic court for crimes committed in Chechnya, 
the Kremlin would have to agree to enter into a treaty with the U.N.337 As 
noted above, it is doubtful Russia would admit that its own domestic 
system is incapable of dispensing justice.338 Consequently, it seems 
unrealistic to expect the creation of an internationalized domestic court 
through a treaty between Russia and the U.N. 
The second method for creating an internationalized domestic court 
generally arises in situations where a new state is emerging.339 With this 
method, the U.N. Security Council, acting pursuant to its Chapter VII 
powers, creates an interim administration to bring order to a war torn 
territory.340 The interim administration is vested with the power to 
establish a viable judicial system to prosecute criminal cases arising from 
prior unrest.341 The East Timor Special Panels provide a good example of 
See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Aug. 14, 2000 (amended Jan. 2002), arts. 2, 3, 
available at http://www.sierraleone.org/specialcourtstatute.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2004). 
 332. See infra notes 333–52. 
 333. BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 293, at 397. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 397–98. 
 336. Id. at 398. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See supra note 288–290 and accompanying text. 
 339. See, e.g., BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 293, at 401–05. This method was used to create the 
East Timor Special Panels during East Timor’s transition to independence. Id. at 401–03. In addition, 
the same process was used to establish the Kosovar Judicial System. Id. at 404–05. Kosovo is 
presently still part of Serbia, but the territory is currently pushing for independence. Id. 
 340. BASSIOUNI, supra note 272, at 553–54, 559. 
 341. Id. at 554–55, 559–60. 
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how this process operates.342 The U.N. Security Council, acting under its 
Chapter VII powers, established a transitional administration in East 
Timor to help the newly independent country complete is devolution from 
Indonesia.343 In trying to stabilize the country, the U.N. transitional leaders 
established the East Timor Special Panels to prosecute those responsible 
for serious crimes committed during the Indonesian occupation.344 The 
goal was to help develop the East Timor judicial system, and to bring 
those individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and serious domestic crimes to justice.345 
There are two reasons why it is unlikely an internationalized domestic 
court in Chechnya would be established in this manner.346 First, Chechnya 
is considered to be a territory within Russia.347 The U.N. does not 
presently recognize Chechnya as a sovereign state, and nor did it even 
after the First Chechen War, when tentative independence was 
established.348 Thus, it is unlikely the U.N. Security Council would push to 
establish an interim administration in Chechnya, as Chechnya is not 
transitioning to independence. Secondly, even if the Security Council did 
wish to establish an interim administration in Chechnya, Russia would 
have veto power over any resolution to establish such an administration.349 
The power to create an interim administration falls within the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII powers to ensure international peace and 
security.350 Thus, the Security Council’s five permanent members would 
have to unanimously agree on the resolution.351 Agreeing to such a 
resolution would be tantamount to Russia granting Chechnya 
independence.352 Given the lengths Russia has taken to prevent the 
secession of Chechnya,353 it is unlikely an internationalized domestic court 
for Chechnya could be established in this way.  
 342. See infra notes 343–45 and accompanying text. 
 343. BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 293, at 401–03; see also U.N. S.C. Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 
1999); U.N. S.C. Res. 1264 (Sept. 15, 1999), para. 3. 
 344. See supra note 343. 
 345. See supra note 343. 
 346. See infra notes 347–51 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 349. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. 
 350. See generally U.N. CHARTER chap. VII; see also U.N. S.C. Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) 
(establishing a U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor). 
 351. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2, art. 27, para. 3. 
 352. U.N. Transitional Administrations are designed to help a territory during the process of 
decolonization or secession. See, e.g., BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 293, at 401. 
 353. See supra notes 16–76 and accompanying text. 
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In conclusion, it appears that the methods used to create 
internationalized domestic tribunals prevent such a court from being 
created to try crimes committed in Chechnya. The major obstacle is the 
necessity of the Kremlin’s acquiescence, both for creation via treaty and 
creation via transitional administration.354 For reasons described above, 
such acquiescence is unlikely.355 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has demonstrated that Russian soldiers, military officers, and 
government officials have committed serious breaches of both Russian 
domestic criminal law and international criminal law. Chechen civilians 
have endured great pain and suffering at the hands of Russian forces. In 
spite of these blatant breaches of criminal law, however, the majority of 
those responsible will never face criminal punishment. The Russian 
domestic criminal system is incapable of imposing accountability on those 
responsible due to impunity granted by the Kremlin and half-hearted 
efforts at prosecution.356 Unfortunately, the international criminal law 
system is equally incapable of providing justice because of severe 
jurisdictional barriers.357 It appears that for the present, Chechen victims 
who are denied criminal justice in the Russian domestic system will not 
see responsible parties criminally prosecuted in any forum.358 
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